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B. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS CHESTER PERRY, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12611 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction 
by jury of the charge of robbery in the Court 
of the Fourt Judicial District, The Honorable 
Joseph E. Nelson, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by jury trial 
January 14, 1970, and sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison to the indeterminate term on 
January 21, 1970, as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant prays for a reversal of. 
the judgment of conviction .and for an order 
1. 
of this Court remanding the case to the 
Fourth Judicial District for further 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of Appellant's brief, 
the transcripts of testimony will be herein-
after characterized as "P." which will 
denote the testimony adduced at preliminary 
hearing, and "T." for testimony at time of 
trial of the matter. 
On December 12, 1968, two men 
entered the residence of David Harness in 
Orem, Utah. While one of these men 
remained with the wife and family of Mr. 
Harness, the other forced Mr. Harness to 
transport him to the Allen Super Save 
Market in Orem, Utah, which Mr. Harness 
then managed. Subsequent to their arrival 
at the store, this second man, whom it is 
alleged and maintained is the accused, 
there required Mr. Harness to remove the 
contents of the store safe, approximately 
$5,000, and place it in his possession. 
The money in hand, this second man then 
rejoined his partner at the Harness' 
residence and were not seen again thereafter. 
Witnesses who testified to these 
various events are as follows: David 
Harness, (P. 13-42; T. 23-40); his wife 
Darlene Harness, (P. 42-63; T. 40-53); 
Clark Burgner Naylor, (P. 63-76; T. 67-74); 
Floyd Hallsey, (P. 76-90; T. 53-62); his 
wife, Ruth Hallsey, (P. 90-98; T. 62-67); 
and Dean Olsen, (T. 74-77). 
It was established by testimony of 
these witnesses, and more pointedly by the 
testimony of the investigating officers, · 
that, aside from the eyewitness identification 
of the accused, there was absolutely no 
palpable evidence or information of any kind 
which might tend to link the Appellant to 
the offense charged. (Officer Kenneth 
Pilkington, P. 100, L. 9-16; Officer Val 
Kilpack, P. 111, L. 16 to P. 112, L. 14). 
There exists in the record no circumstantial 
or other competent evidence which would be 
probative of this accused's guilt; save 
the testimony of the eyewitness, the record 
is barren of such evidence. 
With one possible exception, Dean 
Olsen, each of the previously mentioned 
eyewitnesses, after having been shown a 
series of pictures from which the Appellant 
was identified as the perpetrator of the 
robbery, the Orem police then informed 
the witness that the individual he:.- had·. 
identified was involved in a crime of 
uniquely similar fact situation in the 
State of California. (Officer Pilkington, 
T. 8, L. 25 to T. 9, L. 26; David Harness, 
P. 25, L. 25 to P. 26, L. 9; Darlene 
Harness, P. 55, L. 12-30; Clark Burnger 
Naylor, P. 74, L. 6-30). 
The testimony of each witness, with 
the notable exception of Dean Olsen, also 
indicated that at the incipience of the 
preliminary hearing, when Appellant was 
first seen by these eyewitnesses, the 
4. 
Appellant was in the custody of police 
officers and was wearing handcuffs. 
(David Harness, P. 40, L. 7-15; P. 41, 
L. 6-30; Darlene Harness, T. 51, L. 23 to 
T. 52, L. 20; Clark Naylor, P. 75, L. 16-20 
and T. 73, L. 10-21; Floyd Hallsey, P. 89, 
L. 21-30; Ruth Hallsey, P. 96, L. 23-29; 
P. 97, L. 28-30; T. 65, L. 17-28). 
Of critical importance is the test-
imony of Dean Olsen, who was not present at 
the prelimi~ary hearing it appears, and had 
not seen the accused prior to the time of 
trial according to his own testimony. (T. 75, 
L. 23-26). Mr. Olsen ultimately identified 
a member of the jury as the individual who 
committed the crime which he had witnessed 
under no different circumstances from those 
under which the other witnesses viewed the 
crime. Olsen stated that, "If I were to 
name anyone that looks anything like the 
individual that approached us, I would 
say the second man here on the front row." 
5. 
(T. 77, L. 13-19; also see T. 76, L. 20-30}. 
The Court will readily note the unlikelihood 
of the Appellant being seated in the jury 
box. 
Based in part upon the testimony 
elicited at the preliminary hearing, defense 
counsel made a motion to suppress the 
testimony of witnesses David Harness, 
Darlene Harness, Clark Naylor, Floyd 
Hallsey, and Ruth Hallsey. (R. 16-19; 
T. 7, L.9 to T. 20, L.9}. The motion was 
denied. (T. 20, L. 10}. And again at 
the close of trial, defense counsel moved 
for a directed verdict of not guilty on the 
same basis as the previous motion to 
suppress, now enhanced by the fact that 
the only witness the State produced at trial 
who was not in court when the Appellant 
was in the custody of police and in hand-
cuffs, and who had obviously not been 
coached, failed to identify the Appellant. 
This motion was likewise denied. (T. 78, 
6. 
L. 3 0 to T. 8 0 , L • 19 ) • 
It should also be noted that in 
conjunction with these previously mentioned 
motions, defense counsel strenuously 
objected to the fatal variance between 
the Complaint, (R. 4), which charge 
Appellant with having committed the 
offense of 11 Armed Robbery," a character-
ization to which counsel did not object, 
by " ••• tak(ing) from the presence of 
David Harness, and from the safe of 
Allens Super Save Market . . . the sum 
of approximately $5,000.00 ... , 11 
(emphasis added), and the Information, 
(R. 13), which charged Appellant with 
the crime of robbery in that 11 • • • the 
said Thomas Chester Perry did, with force 
of arms, take personal property from the 
possession of David Harness, against his 
Will. II (T. 20, L. 14-24; T. 79, L. 29). 
The Complaint alleges an offense against 
the possession of Allen's Super Save and 
the Information alleges an offense against 
David Harness, a different offense and 
therefor a fatal variance. The motions 
to dismiss the Information on this ground 
were likewise denied. (T. 22, L. 7; T. 80, 
L. 19). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED AT 
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF TRIAL, AS THE IN-COURT 
IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT WAS TAINTED BY 
AN IMPROPERLY SUGGESTIVE PRETRIAL IDENTIF-
ICATION PROCEEDURE. 
"Almost all knowledgable authorities 
agree that eyewitness identification is 
the most unreliable form of proof." The 
Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, Daniel 
E. Murray, 1966 Utah Law Rev., 611. Because 
of the inherent frailness of proof of the 
8. 
kind involved in the subject case, i.e., 
eyewitness identification, it is incumbent 
upon the judicial process to take special 
care to insure that such proof is not 
tainted by unnecessary and highly persuasive 
suggestion. This is especially so where, 
as here, the entire quantum of proof rests 
in the visual recognition of the accused, 
and nothing more. 
Appellant here asserts that the 
little rogue's gallery of photographs which 
the witnesses viewed in order to make their 
identification prior to trial was conducted 
in a fashion calculated to emphasize the 
"we've got the man" psychology which is so 
productive in crystallizing an honest but 
unsure identification into one steadfast 
and wrong. If these witnesses picked out 
a man who looked much the same as the man 
they had seen on the day of the crime, 
Officer Pilkington dutifully served to 
expunge all remaining doubt from their minds. 
9. 
Note the following colloquy between defense 
counsel and Officer Pilkington at hearing on 
the motion to suppress: 
Q: Officer, you did make an 
investigation of the reported 
event of December 12? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: In connection with that invest-
igation, did you talk with the 
witnesses who have been sworn 
here today, that is David Harness, 
Darlene Harness, Clark Naylor, 
Ruth Hallsey, and Floyd Hallsey? 
A: I did. 
Q: Did you show each of these 
witnesses pictures of Mr. Perry? 
A: I did. 
Q: Let me ask you if you informed 
each of the witnesses that Mr. 
Perry had been charged with and 
convicted of a criminal offense 
that bore a great deal of similarity 
to the offense which these witnesses 
witnessed in Orem, and that charge 
and conviction had taken place 
in the State of California? 
A: Not prior to the witnesses 
identifying the picture. 
Q: After identifying the pictures 
you did inform them? 
A: That a similar crime had been 
committed in California. 
( T • 8 , L • 2 5 to T . 9 , L . 2 6 ) • 
The officer seemed here to feel th?t 
so long as the picture was identified, he 
could then say anything he wished about the 
, I\ 
subject portrayed, in effect stating to 
the witness: "We have the man." 
This primary taint was then heightened 
by the fact that all witnesses, now armed 
with the conviction that the individual in 
custody had been involved in a similar type 
of crime in another state, were allowed 
to view the Appellant in handcuffs in police 
custody. If any doubt remained as to 
whether the person in the picture was the 
man in question it was dispelled at that 
point, because, having seen the Appellant 
in custody with handcuffs on and relating 
the accused's in person appearance back to 
the photograph and the officer's suggestive 
statement respecting the individual portrayed, 
if the witness didn't recall the actual 
appearance of the man involved in the robbery, 
he had now a familiar face and thus a readily 
believable substitute. The question is: what 
was being identified, the man in the picture 
or the perpetrator of the crime? 
11. 
The trial which might determine the 
accused's fate may well not be that 
in the court room but that at the 
pretrial confrontation, with the 
State aligned against the accused, 
the sole witness the jury, and the 
accused unprotected against over-
reaching, intentional or unintentional, 
with little or no effective appeal 
from the judgment there rendered by 
the witness ---- "that's the man." 
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, at 235,236. 
The specific problem of the instant 
case is dealt with in Simmons v. U.S., 390 
U.S. 377: 
It must be recognized that improper 
employment of photographs by police 
may sometimes cause witnesses to 
err in identifying criminals. 
. . . The chance of misidentification 
is also heightened if the police 
indicate to the witness that they 
have other evidence that one of the 
persons pictured committed the crime. 
Regardless of how the initial mis-
identification comes about, the 
witness thereafter is apt to retain 
in his memory the image of the 
photograph rather than of the person 
actually seen, reducing the trust-
worthiness of subsequent lineup or 
courtroom identification. 390 U.S. 
at 383, 384. 
What the Court in Simmons is the probability 
that suggestive statements are likely to 
confirm a misidentification. This case 
12. 
provides a paradigm example. It is of 
no small importance that the only witness 
called by the State as an eyewitness who had 
not apparently been previously coached 
failed miserably in identifying the defendant. 
The verdict and judgment below should be set 
aside on the ground that ". . . the photo-
graphic proceedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification." Simmons, supra, 390 
U.S. at384. At least, the testimony of 
the witnesses at the preliminary hearing 
should have been suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS 
THE INFORMATION FOR RECITING A.1\1 OFFENSE IN 
SUBSTANTIAL AND FATAL VARIANCE FROM THE 
ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT. 
As has been pointed out in pages 7 
and 8 of this brief, a variance in the 
the charges existed between Complaint and 
13. 
Information existed at time of trial and 
counsel objected thereto. Appellant's only 
contention on appeal is that this discrepancy 
should be clarified, and a new trial granted 
to eliminate the prejudice. The mischief 
created is that Appellant was bound over 
from the preliminary hearing on a charge 
materially different from that upon which 
he was tried. Such an error, actually 
having prejudiced the defendant in respect 
to a substantial right, is grounds for 
vitiating the entire proceeding. 77-53-2, 
U.C.A., 1953. Being tried for an alleged 
offense materially different from the 
charge upon which defendant was bound over 
for is a serious violation of the accused's 
right to the due process of the law where 
his liberty hangs in the balance. Art. I, 
§7, Utah Constitution; Amendment 14, §1, 
United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Whereforf Defendant-Appellant 
prays that the verdict and judgment of the 
I 
14. 
trial court be vacated and this case 
remanded to the Fourth District Court 
of Utah County for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERSCHEL BULLEN 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant. 
409 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
